

EXHIBIT NO. 11

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

A16/01687

CPL/10

Long Beach, California
October 18, 1940

		01
From:	Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.	05
To:	Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet..	-----
Subject:	International situation - Reenforcement of the Asiatic Fleet.	06
Enclosures:	(A) Copy of assumptions.	11
	(B) Copy of tentative operations.	12
1.	During the recent visit of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, to Washington and on October 10, the Secretary told the Commander-in-Chief that the President was considering, in connection with possible retaliatory measures taken by Japan against Great Britain upon opening of the Burma Road, the following:	15
	(a) Reenforcement of the Asiatic Fleet as a peace-time move.	16
	(b) Declaring a complete embargo on shipments to and from Japan.	18-A
	(c) Attempting to stop <u>all</u> trade between Japan and the Americas. To accomplish this latter measure, he (the President) proposed establishment of patrol lines of light forces from Honolulu westward to the Philippines and a second line roughly from Samoa to Singapore, "in support of" the first line. The impracticability of this and other suggestions was explained to the Secretary, and, after some further conversations dealing with eventualities and at the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, and his War Plans Officer in conjunction with the War Plans Division of the Chief of Naval Operation's office, submitted a memorandum (Enclosure A) of assumptions outlining the situation presented by the Secretary and a brief outline sketch of operations (Enclosure B) by the U. S. Fleet to meet the assumptions in a more practicable manner. This was submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations on October 11 for	19
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Long Beach, California
October 16, 1940

Subject: International situation - Reinforcement of
the Asiatic Fleet.

submission to the Secretary and the President
as to what the Navy proposed to do if directed
to proceed on the proposed assumptions and
tentative decisions.

2. To date, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet,
has had no further word in regard to the memorandum re-
ferred to above, but received a despatch today from the
Chief of Naval Operations directing that a copy be for-
warded to you via the HOUSTON. It is believed that
further study in the Department and in the Fleet will
result in some modifications in the operations proposed
for the Fleet, particularly as regards distribution of
patrol planes and cruisers.

3. The further operations indicated in paragraph
9 of Enclosure (B) are measures for the reduction and oc-
cupation of the Marshall Islands, or a feint in the Mid-
Pacific which will be initiated when a train is assembled
and transports are ready. Due to the situation in the
Atlantic, the Department did not feel that our main Fleet
should get too far in the Pacific, as it might be neces-
sary to call it back on short notice. It was felt,
however, that active operations against ORANGE possessions
might have a deterrin effect on ORANGE full scale opera-
tions in the South China Sea and Dutch East Indies.

4. It will be noted that the above operations
parallel very closely the present ORANGE Plan, modified by
the despatch of an Advance Force to the Asiatic and
further modified by the restriction of main Fleet opera-
tions to the Mid-Pacific area.

5. I was further told, in the Department that no
Army forces would be available and that the British had
agreed to the United States' use of Singapore.

6. In the event that the assumptions are not
realized prior to about January 1, 1941, or decisions are
not reached to despatch the Advance Detachment before that

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time, there was discussion of assembling a train and trans-
ports in West Coast ports and holding a full dress re-
hearsal of operations against an atoll, as a Fleet exercise,
utilizing Christmas Island as a site. Steps are being
taken for the acquisition and conversion of the necessary
transporte, etc., to be ready around that time. If this is
done, the reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet may take place
coincidentally with this exercise, the idea being that Japan
will be impressed by this evidence of United States de-
termination to protect its interests. I presume you will
be further informed of this eventuality as plans are more
fully developed.

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7. My secret serial A16/01683 of this date, cover-
ing the composition and preparation of the tentative de-
tachment slated for reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet, i
case such a move is ordered, was forwarded to you by
clipper locked box, a copy being sent on the HOUSTON with
this letter.

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8. It is hereby certified that the originator
considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in
such a manner as will permit a classification other than
secret.

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J. O. RICHARDSON

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Copy to: (..a airmail)

OpNAV (This copy ~~classified~~ by OpNAV despatch
192000 of Oct 6)

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Op-128-2-McC

10-11-40

in CaseMEASURES AND OPERATIONS TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE U.S. FLEET

1. Mobilize U.S. Fleet, in accordance with Orange Plan.
2. Redispose forces now in the Atlantic as follows:
 - a. Move 2 heavy cruisers and one division of 4 Old Destroyers to Southern Brazil - Uruguay, and Argentine ports, basing locally or on Falkland Islands in order to interdict ORANGE trade and protection of U.S. Shipping.
 - b. Move 2 heavy cruisers, one aircraft carrier, and 4 destroyers (from Pacific) to cover west coast ports of South America, basing locally or at Panama.
 - c. Move 18 Old Destroyers to Pacific for local defense and protection of U.S. Shipping as follows:-
 - 9 to Puget Sound and Alaska
 - 5 to San Francisco
 - 4 to Hawaii
 - d. Move one aircraft carrier, one light cruiser, two transports, one destroyer tender, all new destroyers, one Destroyer transport, plus 1st Marine Brigade (now at Guantanamo), and three new submarines, and three old submarines to West Coast.
 - e. Move PatWing 5 (____planes) with tenders to San Diego for local coastal defense (relieve PatWings 1 and 4).

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Plan I

3. Take measures for defense of Alaska as follows:
 - a. Dispatch two submarines and small tender to Dutch Harbor.
 - b. Reinforce Marine garrison at Dutch Harbor by remainder of defense battalion, housing them in vessels chartered for the purpose.
 - c. Dispatch one squadron (6 planes) of Patrol Planes, plus tender, to Dutch Harbor, and one squadron (6 planes) and tender to Kodiak.
 - d. Prepare a detachment for possible dispatch to East Indies area, consisting of 4 CA, 1 CV, 9 DD, 4 AMD, (Desdiv 51), 1 AC, & AD. (This force will reinforce U.S. Asiatic Fleet units which will have retired to this area, and will operate in conjunction with British and Dutch Naval Forces. Upon arrival Asiatic waters, this force will report to the Commander-in-Chief, ASIATIC FLEET. (NOTE: If degaussing and other mobilization measures have not been completed prior to departure, this hazard will have to be accepted, and materials required will have to be forwarded at a later date. In addition, if sent prior to the completion of readiness measures for the operation of the main body in the Mid-Pacific, it must be realized that war may result with this valuable force exposed and unsupported. The same is true of the Asiatic Fleet.
5. Dispatch promptly from Hawaii a detachment consisting of carrier, cruisers, and destroyers to sweep North Pacific waters between Hawaii and Alutians for Japanese commerce, or Japanese raiders. To be fitted in with mobilization requirements.
6. Assemble transports and train and embark 2nd Reinforced Marine Brigade in West Coast ports.

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7. Take measures for defense of Pacific Islands as follows: -
- a. Reinforce MIDWAY with remainder of Defense Battalion, 2 Patrols, 4 OSS, 1 ASR.
 - b. Operate 2 SS for defense of WAKE.
 - c. Operate 2 SS and 1 Patrol with tender from JOHNSTON ISLAND, provide small Marine listening post.
 - d. Operate 6 VP, 1 AVP, and 2 SS for defense of CANTON ISLAND.
 - e. Dispatch 2 OSS for defense of SAMOA.
 - f. Dispatch 2 Patrols of Patwing ONE to HAWAII (24 Planes) after relief by Patwing FIVE.
8. Dispatch remainder of Subrons FOUR and SIX (Approximately 24 SS) to CAROLINES and MARSHALLS for preliminary reconnaissance operations.
9. Upon completion of mobilisation preparations, assemble fleet in HAWAII prepared to initiate further measures as the situation requires.
10. Assist in defense of U.S. Shipping by the detail of certain Fleet Forces to Coastal Frontier forces. ~~in the~~ the Pacific this will be comprise: -
- 4 DM to HAWAII
 - 3 OCL to Pacific Coastal Frontier.

SECRET

October 11, 1940

U. S. FLEET Dispositions and Operations to meet special situation in Western Pacific.

ASSUMPTIONS.

1. The Gravity of the situation existing today is intensified by the opening of the Burma Road by Great Britain.
2. The Japanese announce or indicate that the opening of the Burma Road is an act unfriendly to Japan.
3. The Japanese undertake retaliatory measures to enforce cooperation with Japan by Great Britain in the Far East.
4. Japan undertakes positive aggressive action to enforce full cooperation by the Dutch East Indies.
5. The United States proclaims complete embargo on shipments from the United States or United States possessions to Japan and non-intercourse with Japan.
6. The United States undertakes by diplomatic and naval action to prevent Japanese trade, in Japanese ships and in ships of other nations, with the Western Hemisphere.
7. The United States will support British forces in the Western Pacific, - in Australia and Singapore, - and Dutch Forces in the Dutch East Indies in stopping Japanese trade south of China Sea - Celebes Sea area.
8. The United States is prepared to accept war if the measures taken cause Japan to declare war.
9. Great Britain will prevent any naval aggression in the Western Atlantic against the Western Hemisphere by the Axis Powers.
10. The situations and decisions by the United States assumed herein may arise 17 October, 1940.